Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Volume 41
Issue 2 Winter 2010

Article 6

2010

Judicial Transparency, Judicial Ethics, and a Judicial
Solution: An Inspector General for the Courts
Ronald D. Rotunda
Chapman University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj
Part of the Judges Commons
Recommended Citation
Ronald D. Rotunda, Judicial Transparency, Judicial Ethics, and a Judicial Solution: An Inspector General for the Courts, 41 Loy. U. Chi. L. J.
301 (2010).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol41/iss2/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University Chicago Law
Journal by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.

Judicial Transparency, Judicial Ethics, and a Judicial
Solution: An Inspector General for the Courts
Ronald D. Rotunda*

I. INTRODUCTION

Our judiciary finds itself subject to much criticism of late. 1 The
federal judiciary, in particular, has problems because its lifetime tenure
and salary protection 2 do not invite the robust discipline that is possible
(although not always attained) in the state court system. 3 Although
these constitutional protections give federal judges unique and valued
independence, the federal judiciary often acts very thin-skinned,
objecting to vocal criticism with all the vigor that the ancient dinosaurs
had wished they could muster when they saw a comet heading towards
earth.
The most prominent of those who fear the loss of judicial
independence is Justice Sandra Day O'Connor. 4 Since her retirement,
* The Doy & Dee Henley Chair and Distinguished Professor of Jurisprudence, Chapman
University School of Law.
1. Consider, for example, the remarks of Michael S. Greco, the President of the American Bar
Association in 2005. His address to the American Bar Association House of Delegates, on
August 8, 2005, noted:
The past year has witnessed the killing of judges and their family members, the attempt
to strip away the jurisdiction and discretion of our courts, the demand to impeach
judges for doing what they are supposed to do - apply the law to the facts and decide
cases fairly, and threats of budget cuts for the judiciary by those who disagree with
court rulings.
Michael S. Greco, President, Am. Bar Ass'n, Address to the American Bar Association House of
Delegates, at 3-4 (Aug. 8, 2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/op/greco/speeches/
hodannual.pdf.
2. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2.8 (7th ed.
2004); 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 2.9 (4th ed. 2007).
3. THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
PROBLEMS & MATERIALS 676-92 (10th ed. 2008).
4. She is hardly alone. For example, in 2005, the ABA President complained, "[Olur own
courts are under unprecedented attack." Greco, supra note 1, at 3. "We ... must not allow our
independent judiciary to become hostage to any interest group or ideology." Id. at 4. Yes, we
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she has repeatedly warned that "the breadth of the unhappiness being
currently expressed, not only by public officials, but in public opinion
polls in the nation" against federal judges is "certainly cause for great
concern." 5 She expressed alarm that some of these vocal critics would
"strong-arm" the judiciary into adopting their policies. "It takes a lot of
degeneration before a country falls into dictatorship," she warned, "but
we should avoid these ends by avoiding these beginnings." 6 Unless we
act now, Justice O'Connor predicted, we risk nothing less than
dictatorship.
She has repeated these concerns in various forums. 7 After looking
back on her lifetime of experience as a practicing lawyer, a state judge,
criticisms of the
and a Supreme Court Justice, she concludes that these
8
lifetime.
her
in
attack"
serious
most
"the
judiciary are
Strong words indeed. Yet, well within Justice O'Connor's lifetimeshe was born in 1930-there have been serious (and successful) attacks
By comparison, federal judges in
on judicial independence.
contemporary times are living in an era of good feeling.
Consider the information that President Franklin D. Roosevelt told
his Attorney General, Francis Biddle, to pass on to the Supreme Court
in 1942. F.D.R. wanted the Justices to know that he was going through
with the trial of the Nazi saboteurs no matter how the Supreme Court
would rule in Ex Parte Quirin.9 "I want one thing clearly understood,"
said the author of the Court-Packing Plan of 1937 to Biddle, "I won't
hand them over to any United States marshal armed with a writ of

surely should be concerned about judicial hostages, but where are they, and where are the ransom

demands?
5. Sandra Day O'Connor, Remarks at Georgetown University Symposium: Fair and
Independent Courts: A Conference on the State of the Judiciary (Sept. 28-29, 2006), in In-Depth:
On the Importance of Having a Fair and Independent Judiciary, 38 THE THIRD BRANCH:
I,
available at
Oct.
2006, at
COURTS,
OF THE
FEDERAL
NEWSLETTER
http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/l 0-06/indepth/index.html.
6. Nina Totenberg, O'Connor Decries Republican Attacks on Courts, Nat'l Pub. Radio, Mar.
10, 2006, http://www.npr.orgltemplates/story/story.php?storyld=5255712 (referring to the danger
that the "sometimes uncivil tone" of critics poses "a danger to the independence of the judiciary")
(emphasis added).
7. E.g., Sandra Day O'Connor, The Threat to Judicial Independence, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27,
2006, at A18.
8. Sandra Day O'Connor, Remarks at American Law Institute 83rd Annual Meeting (May 17,
2006), 83 A.L.I. PROC. 251 (2006).
9. Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). See generally Ronald D. Rotunda, The Detainee Cases
of 2004 and 2006 and Their Aftermath, 57 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1 (2006) (discussing history and
impact of Ex Parte Quirin).
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habeas corpus. Understand?" 10 Biddle clearly understood. So did
Chief Justice Stone, who said, "That would be a dreadful thing.""]
Shortly thereafter, the Court decided unanimously against Quirin et al.
Within days, the Government executed most of the Nazi saboteurs after
12
a secret trial in the building that housed the F.B.I.
Now, that was real interference with an independent judiciary. In
contrast, today's verbal criticism is child's play. Any student of history
knows that judges, even federal judges, have been under attack since the
beginning-from efforts to impeach Chief Justice John Marshall to
efforts to impeach Chief Justice Earl Warren. 13 Judges seem to prefer
to give criticism rather than receive it. And when it comes to verbal
criticism, some of the harshest critics of judges in contemporary times
are other judges. 14
Judges should not be so thin-skinned. Henry Louis Mencken, whom
we remember as H.L. Mencken, defined a judge as simply "a law
student who marks his own examination papers."' 15 A federal judge
once told me that upon assuming the federal bench, a judge tells three
lies: (1) I am over-worked; (2) I am under-paid; and (3) I was a great
trial lawyer. A federal judge is simply a lawyer who knows a Senator.
Judges, just like the rest of us, put on their robes two legs at a time. As
Professor John Nowak reminded me on at least one occasion, the state
gives robes to judges so that they can look impressive, and God gives
them hemorrhoids so that they can look concerned. The best judges are

10. FRANCIS BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 331 (1962). This book is the second volume of
his memoirs.
11. David J. Danelski, The Saboteurs' Case, 1 J. OF SUP. CT. HIST. 61, 65 (1996). This entire
issue is devoted to "The Supreme Court and World War 1H."
12. Id.
13. JONATHAN M. SCHOENWALD, A TIME FOR CHOOSING: THE RISE OF MODERN AMERICAN
CONSERVATISM 87-91 (Oxford Univ. Press 2001).
14. E.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 606 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe
Court both pre-empts the democratic debate through which genuine consensus might develop and
simultaneously runs a considerable risk of inviting lower court reassessments of our Eighth
Amendment precedents.") (emphasis added); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128-29 (2000) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) ("Although we may never know with complete certainty the identity of the winner
of this year's Presidential election, the identity of the loser is perfectly clear. It is the Nation's
confidence in the judge as an impartialguardian of the rule of law.") (emphasis added); BMW of
N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 600 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Today's decision, though
dressedup as a legal opinion, is really no more than a disagreement with the community's sense
of indignation or outrage expressed in the punitive award of the Alabama jury, as reduced by the
State Supreme Court.") (emphasis added).
15. JAMES E. COMBS & DAN NIMMO, THE COMEDY OF DEMOCRACY 162 (1996).
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more humble and realize that if they are tin gods, it is only in a narrow
world. 16
More seriously, Judge William Pryor gives us a better perspective:
I respectfully disagree with the conventional wisdom of the Bench and
Bar. I submit that the independence of the federal judiciary today is as
secure as ever. The current criticisms of the judiciary are relatively
mild and, on balance, a benefit to the judiciary. I am sympathetic to a
call for an increase in pay, as my spouse, a certified public accountant,
frequently reminds me of the opportunity cost of public service, but to
say that our current pay is a threat to our independence is an
17
exaggeration.
As Judge Pryor reminds us, hyperbolic reaction to modem day vocal
criticism of judges is factually inaccurate. Moreover, it cheapens the
sacrifices of those judges who suffered real threats.
Consider, for example, the courageous judges in the Deep South who
integrated our schools during the civil rights struggle. 18 They issued
desegregation rulings in the face of repeated physical threats against
them and their families. 19 One such example is District Judge J. Skelly
Wright, who later became a judge on the D.C. Circuit. Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg later related a story that Judge Wright's secretary had
told her:
In May 1960, Judge Wright issued the first order ever in Fifth Circuit
territory setting a day certain for the beginning of grade school
desegregation. His signature on that order and earlier rulings, all of
them stridently opposed by strong forces in this State and City, put his
personal safety at risk. Opposition to the Judge's day-certain order,
his secretary recalled, had reached fever-pitch. One evening, when

16. See, e.g., Ronald D. Rotunda, Remembering Judge Walter R. Mansfield, 53 BROOK. L.
REV. 271 (1987).
17. William H. Pryor, Jr., Not-So-Serious Threats To Judicial Independence, 93 VA. L. REV.
1759, 1762-63 (2007). See also William H. Pryor, Jr., JudicialIndependence and the Lesson of
History, ALA. LAW., Sept. 2007, at 389; William H. Pryor, Jr., Neither Force Nor Will, But
Merely Judgment, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2006, at A14; Ronald D. Rotunda, A Few Modest
Proposals to Reform the Law Governing FederalJudicial Salaries, THE PROF. LAW., Fall 2000,
at 1.
18. See Maximilian Amster, Judge Pryor on Judicial Independence, HARV. L. REC., Mar. 15,
2007,
http://media.www.hlrecord.orglmedia/storage/paper6O9/news/2007/03/15/News/Judge.Pryor.On.J
udicial.Independence-2777228.shtml.
19. See J.W. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 221-29 (1971). See e.g., LIVA BAKER, THE SECOND BATTLE OF NEW
ORLEANS: THE HUNDRED-YEAR STRUGGLE TO INTEGRATE THE SCHOOLS (1996); JACK BASS,
TAMING THE STORM: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JUDGE FRANK M. JOHNSON, JR. AND THE SOUTH'S

FIGHT OVER CIVIL RIGHTS 185 (1993); JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES (1981); FRANK SIKORA,
THE JUDGE: THE LIFE & OPINIONS OF ALABAMA'S FRANK M. JOHNSON, JR. (1992).
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Judge Wright and his wife were out, a caller from the White Citizens
Council rang. (Though the phone number was unlisted, it was found
out.) The Wrights' son, James, then age thirteen, answered. "Let me
speak to that dirty nigger-loving Communist," the voice demanded.
Son James replied: "He's not at home. May I take a message?"
Sheltered by loving parents through all the vilification and ostracism
the Wrights endured, their young son simply took it in stride, along
with the cross burned on the lawn and the company of U.S. marshals
20
around the clock.
To suggest that modem criticism is as serious as what Judge Wright
experienced depreciates what he faced.
Judicial independence does not imply immunity from oversight or
from criticism. 2 1 As both Justice Breyer 22 and Chief Justice Roberts
have conceded, "in a limited number of high-profile cases, the judiciary
needed to do a better job,"23 regarding ethics charges. The two Justices
are right: judges should respond to criticism by answering the critics,
not criticizing them. If the critics are mistaken, judges should explain
why, by answering them thoughtfully, not by complaining and raising
the red flag of judicial independence.
In fact, federal judges, of all people, should not fear criticism. As
Professor Steve Lubet has reminded us, "Federal judges have more
insulation than anyone in American political life. A judge with life
24
tenure needs less protection, not more, than an ordinary citizen."
The critics raise important questions that we should not sweep under
the rug. The problem-judge is atypical, and, the problems are indeed
limited. But the federal judiciary has failed us in several high-profile
cases, and there is room for reform. I offer a modest reform that will
help keep our judiciary independent (because no one favors a dependent
judiciary) and will help keep our judiciary accountable (because no one
favors a judiciary that is above the law).

20. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks at Judge Robert A. Ainsworth, Jr. Memorial Lecture at
Loyola University New Orleans, School of Law: Four Louisiana Giants in the Law (Feb. 4,
2002), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_02-04-02.html.
21. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DzIENKOWSKI, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAWYER'S
DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY § 10.1-1.2(b) (2008-2009).
22. JUDICIAL CONDUCT & DISABILITY ACT STUDY COMM., IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABILITY ACT of 1980: A REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE 5 (Sept.
2006), availableat http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/breyercommitteereport.pdf.
23. John G. Roberts, Jr., Remarks at Georgetown University Law Center & American Law
Institute Conference: Fair and Independent Courts: A Conference on the State of the Judiciary
(Sept. 28, 2006), http://www.law.georgetown.edu/news/documents/CoJ092906-roberts.pdf.
24. Henry Weinstein, Complaint Against Judge Has Broader Ramifications, L.A. TIMES, May
7, 2006, at B3.
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II. THE JUDICIAL PLEA FOR STATUTORY CHANGES
Sadly, there are plenty of recent examples of judicial misbehavior
that deserve criticism. Nevada recently removed a state judge who
engaged in bizarre action such as sleeping on the job, breaching security
by hiring private security guards, and inflicting her foul mouth and
mercurial temperament on her staff.2 5 She even made false statements
to impede the Nevada Judicial Discipline Commission's investigation.
The Commission concluded, "The damage resulting from her antics and
willful misconduct will be felt by the judicial system for a significant
future period of time." 26 Earlier, this same Commission removed
another judge who admitted to sexual improprieties, including having
27
sex in hotels with a staff member during working hours.
Recently, the class action specialist, Milberg LLP, has been back in
the news. In 2008, this law firm settled a federal indictment charging it
with a thirty-year kickback scheme. 2 8 As part of the agreement with
federal prosecutors, it repudiated three of its partners, including Melvyn
Weiss. They eventually all pled guilty. Later, we learned that the
Milberg law firm agreed to pay Weiss a share of the law firm's future
lawsuit winnings. 2 9 One would think that would run afoul of ethics
rules that prohibit sharing legal fees with one who is not a member of
the firm, and a non-lawyer to boot-a category that now includes Mr.
Weiss. 30 During the summer of 2008, New York Supreme Court Judge
Herman Cahn approved this payment to Mr. Weiss, even though the
judge acknowledged that the normal rule is that law firms may not share
fees with non-lawyers such as Mr. Weiss, who had forfeited his right to
practice law. 3 1 In December of that year, the Milberg law firm
25. David Kihara, Discipline Commission: Halverson Removed from Bench, LAS VEGAS
REV. J., Nov. 18, 2008, http://www.lvrj.con/news/34633874.html; Debra Cassens Weiss,
DisciplineBody Removes Judge Halverson, Citing 'Bizarre' Staff Treatment, ABA J. LAW NEWS

NOw, Nov. 18, 2008, http://www.abajournal.com/news/discipline-body-removes-judgehalversonciting-bizarre-stafftreatment.
26. Weiss, supra note 25.
27. Kihara, supra note 25.
28. See Michael A. Perino, The Milberg Weiss Prosecution:No Harm, No Foul?, 11 BRIEFLY
(Am. Enterprise Inst. for Pub. Pol'y Res., Wash. D.C.), May 2008.
29. Milberg's New Hire: The Plaintiffs Firm Has an Eye for Talent, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25,
2009, at A14, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123552900194266313.html
[hereinafter Milberg'sNew Hire].
30. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4(a) (2003); ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI,
supra note 21, §§ 5.4-1, 5.4-2 & 5.4-3.
31. The discipline authorities disbarred Weiss after his conviction, which he described in court
on the morning of his sentencing as a "fall from grace." Tiffany Hsu, Melvyn Weiss Sentencedfor
Class-Action Kickback Scheme, L.A. TIMES, June 3, 2008, http://articles.latimes.com/2008/

jun/03/business/fi-weiss3.
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announced that it had hired a new lawyer, Judge Herman Cahn-the
32
same judge who had approved of the Milberg arrangement.
Interesting.
Meanwhile, earlier this year, a Pennsylvania state judge, Mark A.
Ciavarella Jr., pled guilty to taking part in a kickback scheme. A week
after that, a Wilkes-Barre newspaper accused him of fixing an unrelated
33
defamation case where he ordered the newspaper to pay $3.5 million.
State prosecutors charged Ciavarella and another Pennsylvania judge
with taking over $2.6 million in kickbacks from 2003 to 2008 to send
teenagers to two privately run youth detention centers. The
ramifications of this ethical lapse are wide-ranging: the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court will have to overturn up
to 1,200 juvenile convictions
34
because of this illegal kickback scheme.
The mind boggles when one considers these problem-judges. All of
these examples, however, are state judges. The Constitution shields
federal judges with life-time tenure and salary protection. What can be
done to limit the harm that federal problem-judges cause? The answer
is that we should create an institutional check to deal with problemjudges. This would instill desperately needed confidence in the federal
judiciary.
Let us focus on the federal judiciary. In February of 2009, Federal
Judge Samuel Kent pled guilty to obstruction of justice on the eve of his
criminal trial. Federal prosecutors had indicted him for allegedly
sexually abusing two court employees and for failing to fully disclose
the extent of the alleged abuse to a court panel charged with
investigating the matter. 35 He pled guilty to obstruction under a plea

32. Milberg's New Hire, supra note 29.
33. Ian Urbina, Suit Names 2 Judges Accused in a Kickback Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2009,
at A13, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/14/us/l4judge.html?ref=us; See also Ian
Urbina & Sean D. Hamill, Judges Plead Guilty in Scheme to Jail Youths for Profit,N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 12, 2009, at A22, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/13/us/13judge.html?ref=us;
see also Peter Hall & Leo Strupczewski, Judges to Serve More Than Seven Years in Prison After
Pleading Guilty in Kickbacks Probe, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 28, 2009,
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id= 1202427800493&rss=newswire.
34. The other judge was Michael Conahan. See In Re Judge Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr., Judicial
Administration Docket No. 1, 2009 Pa. LEXIS 240 (Pa. Feb. 13, 2009) (per curiam); In re
Ciavarella, 2009 Pa. LEXIS 196 (Pa. Super. Ct. Jan. 28, 2009) (per curiam); see also In re Judge
Michael T. Conahan, Judicial Administration Docket No. 1, 2009 Pa. LEXIS 187 (Pa. Sup. Ct.
Jan. 28, 2009) (per curiam); John Sullivan, Judge May Overturn Hundreds of Cases in Luzerne
Scandal, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Mar. 27, 2009, at Al; Michael Rubinkam & Maryclaire
Dale, Pa. Judges Accused of Jailing Kidsfor Cash, MOBILE PRESS-REGISTER, Feb. 12, 2009, at
A6, availableat 2009 WLNR 3021035.
35. Nathan Koppel, FederalJudge Pleads Guilty to Obstruction, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2009,
at A2, availableat http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 123540590474748727.html.
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agreement that called for the dismissal of the sexual-abuse charges. The
court could have sentenced him to twenty years, but the prosecutors

agreed to ask for no more than three years-still a hefty penalty for a
man who must spend time behind bars with felons he may have
sentenced there earlier. 36 After the House Judiciary Committee voted to
impeach him, he resigned effective immediately. Otherwise, he could
37
have continued to collect his federal judicial salary.
Last fall, another federal judge, U.S. District Judge Edward W.
Nottingham, chief of the federal court in Colorado, resigned, effective
October 29, 2008.38 He did not leave because of his health or a desire
to return to the practice of law. 39 Instead, he faced multiple misconduct
complaints. 40
The Tenth Circuit Chief Judge, Robert H. Henry,

announced that, in response to multiple complaints and investigations,
Judge Nottingham resigned immediately, both as Chief Judge of the
41
District of Colorado and as a United States District Judge.
A month before that, the Judicial Council of the Fifth Circuit
suspended Federal District Judge G. Thomas Porteous Jr. of New
Orleans for two years for failing to report gifts from lawyers who

36. Id.
37. Posting
of
Michael
Winter
to
U.S.A.
Today,
http://blogs.usatoday.com/ondeadline/2009/06/mpeached-us-judge-in-texas-resigns.html
(June
25, 2009, 19:41 EST); see Lisa Olsen, Impeached Kent Quits Judge's Salary Will Stop Tuesday,
HOUS. CHRON., June 26, 2009, at B 1; Stewart M. Powell, Jailed Kent Sees FirstDay as Judge
Without a Salary, Hous.
CHRON.,
July
1, 2009,
at
BI,
available at
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/headline/metro/6507543.html.
38. Felisa Cardona, Nottingham Resigns - Ongoing Misconduct Probe, DENV. POST, Oct. 22,
2008, at Al.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, COURT NEWS AND EVENTS, (Oct. 21, 2008),
http://abajoumal.com/uploads/l0thcircuitscreen-shot.JPG; see e.g., Molly McDonough, Qwest
CEO Judge Nottingham Resigns Amid Misconduct Probe, ABA J. LAW NEWS Now, Oct. 21,
2008,
http://www.abajournal.com/weekly/qwest-judge-nottingham-resigns-ramid_misconduct-probe;
Judge in Qwest CEO Insider Trading Case Resigns, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 21,
2008, http://www.seattlepi.com/business/384302-qwest22.html.
Sean Harrington, who heads a legal technology firm, had filed a complaint in January
citing news reports that Nottingham allegedly viewed adult Web sites on his
government computer in his chambers. Harrington also alleged that Nottingham had
testified in his own divorce case that he spent $3,000 at a strip club. Sealed transcripts
of the divorce case were first obtained in August 2007 by KUSA-TV ....
Another
complaint against Nottingham involved a September 2007 dispute between him and
attorney Jeanne Elliott over a parking spot for the disabled. Nottingham had parked in
the spot, and Elliott parked her wheelchair behind his vehicle and refused to get out of
his way. Police issued Nottingham a $100 ticket.
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appeared before him and for concealing debts while in personal
is urging the House to take
bankruptcy. 42 A Louisiana Congressman
43
Porteous.
impeach
quick action to
A criminal remedy sometimes can deal with severe incidents of
judicial misconduct, but that is not always the resolution. Let me
furnish a recent example that both makes the case for reform, and pleads
for statutory changes. I refer to the In re Opinion of the Judicial
Conference Committee to Review Circuit Council Conduct and
Disability Orders.44 The Opinion deals with Judge Manuel Real, but no
one would know that by reading it. The judges were careful not to
name him, even though Judge Real is no neophyte when it comes to
media attention.
The majority opinion held that under the relevant federal statute, 45 it
had no jurisdiction to discipline Judge Real because the Chief Circuit
Judge of the Ninth Circuit and the Judicial Council of the Ninth Circuit
did not follow the mandatory statutory procedures. The majority said
that the "chief judge may avoid review by the Judicial Conference (and
by definition our committee) by the simple expedient of failing to
appoint a special committee under § 353 and instead dismissing a
complaint under § 352(b). ' 4 6
The reasoning of the majority should be eyebrow-raising. Because
the Ninth Circuit Council and the Chief Judge did not follow procedures
that Congress mandated that they follow, they can prevent further
judicial review! The majority interpreted the statute in a way that
makes no sense. Why would Congress instruct the judges to follow
various procedures and then provide that, if the judges ignore the
statutory mandate, the judges avoid a reviewing court? We can
understand that Congress might provide some sort of penalty when
judges ignore its statute. But why would Congress provide that if

42. Nathan Koppel, FederalJudge Suspended on Misconduct Charges, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13,
2008, at A4, availableat http://online.wsj.comlarticle/SB 122126308499630469
.htmlmod=relevancy.
43. Bruce Alpert, Scalise Urges Quick Action On Porteous Impeachment Probe, THE TIMESPICAYUNE, May 4, 2009, availableat http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2009/05/
scalise.urges quick-actionon.html.
44. In re Opinion of the Judicial Conference Comm. to Review Circuit Council Conduct and
Disability Orders, 449 F.3d 106 (U.S. Jud. Conf. 2006). Judge Dolores K. Sloviter, joined by
Judges Pasco M. Bowman H and Barefoot Sanders, wrote the majority opinion. Judge Ralph K.
Winter, Jr., joined by Judge Carolyn R. Dimmick, dissented.
45. 28 U.S.C. § 351 (2002).
46. Opinion of the Judicial Conference Comm., 449 F.3d at 109. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 352, 353
(2002).
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judges refuse to comply with the discipline procedures governing
judges, then the judges may create their own "get out of jail free" card?
It seems customary in these types of cases for the judges to blame the
legislature for enacting a statute that is difficult to comprehend after the
judges' creative interpretation. Hence, the majority of the members of
this panel-Judges Dolores K. Sloviter, Pasco M. Bowman II, and
Barefoot Sanders-requested that Congress enact new legislation to
solve the problem that this majority had created.4 7 However, we have
no evidence that Judges Sloviter, Bowman, and Sanders actually ever
sent their request to Congress, or asked the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts to send their opinion to Congress. 4 8 The judges
simply said Congress should do something about this problem-the
problem that these judges had created-and then went about other
business.
I propose to grant the majority's wish. Congress should enact new
legislation. Congress should create an Inspector General for the federal
courts. Of course, the details of the statute should provide safeguards to
preserve judicial independence. But Congress should do more than
simply amend the particular statute to cure the strange interpretation of
Judges Sloviter, Bowman, and Sanders. If that is all Congress did, it
would not prevent Judges Sloviter, Bowman, and Sanders, or their
compatriots, from engaging in more creative interpretation in the future.
An Inspector General, among other duties, can advise Congress when
judges in other cases say that Congress needs to amend the statutes.
The problem is the system and not the way Congress has drafted this
particular statute.
Judge Sloviter's opinion is the most recent chapter in a dispute that
started in 2003, when a lawyer filed a judicial misconduct complaint

47. Opinion of the Judicial Conference Comm., 449 F.3d at 109 ("[W]e believe that additional
legislation expanding the scope of the Conference's (and, by delegation, this Committee's)
jurisdiction is necessary .... "). See e.g., Pamela A. MacLean, Panel Says Judge's Ethics Case
Not Handled Properly: 9th Circuit Chief Failed To Appoint A Committee, 28 NAT'L L.J. 6
(2005)("Alleged mishandling of a 2003 judicial misconduct complaint against veteran Los
Angeles federal judge Manuel L. Real prompted the federal judicial discipline committee to
suggest that Congress expand the committee's authority to review such complaints.").
48. The mission of the Administration of the U.S. Courts include the following:
On behalf of the Judicial Conference, the agency transmits draft bills to Congress and
arranges for members of Judicial Conference committees and other judges to testify as
expert witnesses at congressional hearings. As legislation that impacts the courts is
drafted by the House and Senate, the AO communicates the concerns, interests, and
positions of the Judicial Conference and suggests changes or compromises.
Three Branch Coordination, U.S. Courts, http://www.uscourts.gov/ao/branchcoordination.htm
(last visited Oct. 20, 2009).
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against Federal Judge Manuel Real. The complaint alleged that Judge
Real had improperly seized a bankruptcy case from another judge in
order to aid a woman whose probation he was overseeing. The federal
judicial discipline committee ruled that it did not have the power to
sanction Judge Real because the Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit had
improperly investigated the complaint.
Judge Real is no stranger to litigation where he is a party. An earlier
case is Standing Committee v. Yagman.49 The facts that led to the
controversy began when Yagman, a lawyer, sought to disqualify Judge
Manuel Real, who had the case assigned to him. The response of Judge
Real was to seek discipline against the lawyer. The Ninth Circuit
50
rejected the attempt to discipline Yagman.
In an even earlier case Judge Real had granted a directed verdict
against Yagman's clients and then sanctioned Yagman personally for a
quarter of a million dollars. The Ninth Circuit overturned Judge Real's
sanctions and remanded the case for reassignment to another judge. 5 1 It
concluded that Judge Real should not hear further matters involving this
case in order "to preserve the appearance of justice."52
Judge Real did not like that remand, so he challenged the Ninth
Circuit's power to reassign the case. (I am not making this up. Judge
Real just refused to obey the Ninth Circuit.) Yagman then petitioned
for a writ of mandamus. 53 Of course, the Ninth Circuit, once again,
imposed its earlier order. Still, this controversy did not end until the
Supreme Court denied Judge Real's petition for certiorari. 5 4
In Calderon v. IBEW Local 47, the Ninth Circuit held that Judge Real
abused his discretion in dismissing an action. 55 But this was no
ordinary disagreement, where the appellate court simply made new law
or had a different interpretation of that law than the trial judge. Instead,
the Ninth Circuit said, in harsh tones:

49. Standing Comm. v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430 (9th Cir. 1995) (Kozinski, J.) (rejecting
discipline imposed on lawyer for comments about a federal trial judge). This case arose when
Judge Manuel Real was assigned a case and Yagman, a lawyer, sought to disqualify him. For
further factual background regarding this case, see Susan Seager, Judge Sanctions Yagman,
Refers Case to State Bar, L.A. DAILY J., June 6, 1991, at 1.
50. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1445.
51. In re Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165 (9th Cir. 1986).
52. Id. at 1188.
53. Brown v. Baden, 815 F.2d 575, 576 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) ("We grant the writ of
mandamus, thereby directing enforcement of our previous decision that Chief Judge Real be
replaced by a judge randomly selected by the clerk of the district court.").
54. Real v. Yagman, 484 U.S. 963 (1987).
55. Calderon v. IBEW Local 47, 508 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
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The district judge's unseemly haste in dismissing this case, and his
failure to heed the perfectly plausible (and meritorious) explanation
proffered by plaintiff in his motion for reconsideration, has cost the
parties significant money and delay in pursuing this wholly
unnecessary appeal. Justice suffers when judges act in such an
arbitrary fashion. We apologize to the parties and admonish
the
56
districtjudge to exercise more care and patience in the future.
Despite all of these actions, it was not until 2006 that Judge Manuel
Real secured the attention of the Judicial Conference Committee to
Review Circuit Council Conduct and Disability Orders. More precisely,
as far as we know, these earlier cases involving Judge Real's peculiar
behavior did not go to the Judicial Conference Committee. I say, "as far
as we know" because it does not seem to be the custom of the Judicial
Conference Committee to name the judge being investigated. That is a
courtesy that no lawyer has if the client sues him for malpractice, no
matter how frivolous the claim.
Judge Ralph Winter's dissent, joined by Judge Carolyn Dimmick,
warned that allowing judges to police themselves was not working. The
intention is noble-self-policing helps support an independent
judiciary-but the result is a system where the judiciary is sweeping
problems under the rug. The conclusion of these judges is born of their
experience. Their remarks are worth quoting at length:
The judicial misconduct procedure is a self-regulatory one. It is selfregulatory at the request of the judiciary in a legitimate effort to
preserve judicial independence. A self-regulatory procedure suffers
from the weakness that many observers will be suspicious that
complainants against judges will be disfavored.57 The Committee's
decision in this case can only fuel such suspicions.
Later, they further emphasized:
The required statutory procedure was not followed. The complaint
was dismissed without any discussion by the Chief Circuit Judge or
the Council majority of the facts admitted by the District Judge
accused of an improper ex parte contact. The admitted facts would be
regarded by some, if not most, professional observers as establishing
just such a contact. The Committee rules that it has no power to
review the Council's decision because the statutory procedures were
not followed by the Chief Circuit Judge and Council. The disposition
58
of the presentmatter is therefore not a confidence builder.

56. Calderon, 508 F.3d at 887 (emphasis added).
57. In re Opinion of Judicial Conference Comm. to Review Circuit Council Conduct and
Disability Orders, 449 F.3d 106, 117 (U.S. Jud. Conf. 2006) (Winter, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
58. Id. (emphasis added).
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It is time for a change. When we use a system and it does not work,
our response should not be to invoke a shibboleth or catchphrase like
"judicial independence." Our response should be to create a system that
will work.
Judge Manuel Real, as discussed above, has often been the subject of
critical appellate rulings. 59 The particular case that led to this opinion
arose when Judge Real decided that he would personally supervise the
probation of one Deborah M. Canter. She had pled guilty in April 1999
to one count of loan fraud and three counts of making false statements.
She was 42 years old at the time. 60 She was described as a "comely"
61
and "an attractive female."
Two months before she pled guilty, she had separated from her
husband, Gary Canter, who moved out of the house, which they had
rented. Deborah Canter continued to live there. The owner of the house
62
was a trust, which Gary's parents had established.
Deborah Canter continued to live in this house but stopped paying
rent. It cost her less money that way. In October 1999, Alan Canter,
the property's trustee, filed suit, seeking to evict her and collect back
rent. Shortly before her eviction, she personally delivered a letter
asking Judge Real "for his help in preventing her eviction." Deborah
Canter told her lawyer's secretary that the letter (this ex parte contact
with the judge) had "worked." Deborah Canter's own lawyer admitted
that he was "shocked" because it was a "complete no-no going to a
judge secretly without talking to the other side." Judge Real's actions
allowed Deborah Canter to live rent-free for two years, costing the
creditors over $50,000.63

59. In re Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165, 1188 (9th Cir.1986). Students study Judge Real's actions
to learn how judges should not behave. THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 144 (Foundation Press, 4th ed.
1987). See Standing Comm.on Discipline of U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal. v. Yagman,
55 F.3d 1430 (9th Cir. 1995) (reversing disciplinary proceedings against lawyer who made
statements criticizing Judge Real).
60. Deborah Cantor's lawyer said that he had no evidence of any improper relationship
between the judge and Ms. Canter, "but was 'suspicious' because Ms. Canter was a 'cute girl'
who projected a 'waif' persona that was appealing. At the time he thought that perhaps [the
judge] had become aware of her divorce and imminent eviction in the course of one of her
probation visits." In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 425 F.3d 1179, 1189 (9th Cir. Jud.
Council 2005) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
61. In re Complaint of JudicialMisconduct, 425 F.3d at 1180.
62. Id. at 1184.
63. E.g., In re Opinion of Judicial Conference Comm. to Review Circuit Council Conduct and
Disability Orders, 449 F.3d 106, 110 (U.S. Jud. Conf. 2006) (Winter, J., dissenting); In re
Complaint of JudicialMisconduct, 425 F.3d at 1190, 1195 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); Weinstein,
supra note 24, at B3. See ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 21, § 10.2-2.9.
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Judge Real conceded that he met with Canter when the lawyers for
the other party were not present. 64 He conceded that they talked about
her case. Yet, he sought to justify his actions by claiming that he
believed her legal representation was inadequate. One wonders why his
purported rationale was at all relevant. He is a federal judge and is not
supposed to practice law. He is not supposed to give her legal advice or
represent her. Her eviction proceedings were in state court, not federal
court. Federal bankruptcy courts do not have authority to determine
whether counsel is adequately representing parties in state court
proceedings.
Yet even if one actually believed that federal judges could engage in
ex parte communications and interfere with a state proceeding when
this younger woman asked him to intervene, Judge Real never bothered
to hold a hearing on this issue; he simply asserted his new power.
When the trustee filed motions to evict Cantor, Judge Real denied
them. When asked why, Judge Real curtly responded, "Just because I
65
said it."
Judges may not meet with litigants ex parte and then use their power
in a federal case to help a litigant in a state case. Judge Real's orders
lacked legal authority. Furthermore, he based his unlawful orders "on
ex parte communications from the debtor for whose benefit those orders
'66
were entered."
Nonetheless, Judge Mary M. Schroeder, Chief Judge of the Ninth
Circuit, summarily dismissed an ethics complaint against Judge Manuel
Real. The Ninth Circuit's ten-member Judicial Council sent the matter
back to her for further disposition. The judges said: "A judge may not
67
use his authority in one case to help a party in an unrelated case."
That would seem to be a noncontroversial opinion, but Judge Schroeder
would not embrace that view. On remand, Judge Schroeder again

64. See Ronald D. Rotunda, Judicial Comments on Pending Cases: The Ethical Restrictions
and the Sanctions, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 611, 612 (2001) [hereinafter Rotunda, Judicial
Comments].
65. In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 425 F.3d at 1184 (Kozinski, J., dissenting)
(quoting from the transcript).
66. Id. at 1188. It is well established that judges may not exercise judicial power based on
secret or ex parte communications from one of the parties to the dispute. United States v.
Thompson, 827 F.2d 1254, 1258-59 (9th Cir. 1987); see also ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra
note 21, §§ 10.2-2.9, 10.3-3.8 to 10.3-3.10; MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 3 at 682-90;
Rotunda, Judicial Comments, supra note 64, at 611.
67. In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 425 F.3d at 1187 (Kozinski, J.,dissenting)
(quoting Judicial Council Order at 5-6 (Dec. 18, 2003)).
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dismissed the complaint, apparently finding that there was nothing
improper.68
When the matter finally reached the Judicial Council, it decided not
to "upset that factual finding." 69 However, Judge Schroeder was not
supposed to make any factual findings. First, the Chief Judge did not
conduct an evidentiary hearing. Second, under the federal statute 70 and
court rules, 7 1 her authority is limited to determining whether there is
credible evidence of misconduct. She may dismiss the complaint only
if credible evidence is entirely lacking. One wonders why judges would
defer to another judge's actions that neither the federal statute nor the
court rule authorized. The judge conceded the fact of the ex parte
contact, so no one could claim that there was no credible evidence of
misconduct.
That should be another eyebrow-raiser: the appellate court deferred to
the unlawful exercise of authority by Chief Judge Schroeder.
A panel of judges on the Ninth Circuit demanded that Judge Real
acknowledge his misconduct but, nonetheless, ruled that "[w]e are
satisfied that adequate corrective action has been taken such that there
will be no re-occurrence of any conduct that could be characterized as
inappropriate." 72
In one of the two dissents, Judge Kozinski
complained:
Unfortunately, the majority's exiguous order seems far more
concerned with not hurting the feelings of the judge in question. But
our first duty as members of the Judicial Council is not to spare the
feelings of judges accused of misconduct. It is to maintain public
confidence in the judiciary by ensuring that substantial allegations of
misconduct are dealt with forthrightly and appropriately. This the
73
majority has failed to do.

68. Id. at 1180-81 (quoting Judicial Council Order at 5-6 (Dec. 18, 2003)).
69. Id. at 1181.
70. "The chief judge shall not undertake to make findings of fact about any matter that is
reasonably in dispute." 28 U.S.C. § 352(a) (2002).
71. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RULES FOR JUDICIAL-CONDUCT AND
JUDICIAL-DISABILITY
PROCEEDINGS
R.
4,
10
(2008),
available
at
http://207.41.19.15JWeb/OCELibra.nsf/504ca249c786e20f85256284006da7ab/1900867fl 1b4c90
d882563e70082e7a9/$FILE/rules judicial-conduct.pdf.
72. In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 425 F.3d at 1181-82. The panel of judges
included Alarc6n, Kozinski, Kleinfeld, McKeown and W. Fletcher, Circuit Judges, and Ezra,
Levi, McNamee, Strand and Winmill, District Judges. Id. at 1180. No judge signed the "order,"
which was the opinion denying any remedy. Ezra, Chief District Judge, filed an opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part. Id. at 1182. Kozinski, Circuit Judge, filed a dissenting
opinion. Id. at 1183. Winmill, District Judge, filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at 1202.
73. Id. at 1198 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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The Judicial Conference of the United States referred the matter to a
five-judge disciplinary committee, which concluded (three to two) that
it could not act because Chief Judge Schroeder failed to convene a
special committee. 74 Then, after creating the unusual interpretation that
led to this result, it said that Congress should enact additional legislation
75
to deal with this issue.
The two-person dissent explained that two facts were "indisputable":
First, the record would support a finding of misconduct in the form of
an ex parte contact resulting in a judicial ruling. Second, the
mandatory statutory procedures regarding judicial misconduct
petitions were not followed by either76 the Chief Circuit Judge or the
Judicial Council of the Ninth Circuit.
The majority of the judges was unwilling to act, and then said that the
problem was not them but the statute. The dissenters were dismayed
that there was no discipline of the judge. They were doubly dismayed
that the court's "self-regulatory procedure" fueled suspicions that the
judges will disfavor investigating their own. And so they concluded
that the "disposition of the present matter is therefore not a confidence
builder." 77
Sadly, the dissenters are correct: "disposition of the present matter is
therefore not a confidence builder."7 8 The majority is also correct that
Congress must change the statute. The Inspector General legislation
would be an appropriate response.
In the meantime, Judge Real's actions permitted Deborah M. Canter
$35,000 in rent and
to live rent-free for three years, costing her creditors
79
thousands of additional dollars in legal costs.

1II. AN INSPECTOR

GENERAL FOR THE COURTS

Justice O'Connor has argued that an Inspector General for the Courts
is a "threat to judicial independence." 80 "Argued," may not be the

74. In re Opinion of Judicial Conference Comm. to Review Circuit Council Conduct and
Disability Orders, 449 F.3d 106, 109 (U.S. Jud. Conf. 2006).
75. Id. "[W]e believe that additional legislation expanding the scope of the Conference's (and,
by delegation, this Committee's) jurisdiction is necessary before we may review the Judicial
Council's order affirming the chief judge's dismissal of the complaint." Id.
76. Id. at 109-10 (Winter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
77. Id. at 117 (emphasis added).
78. Id.
79. Weinstein, supra note 24, at 3B. Legal fees brought the total loss to approximately

$50,000.
80. O'Connor, supra note 7, at A18.
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tends to be more vigorous than
appropriate word, for her opposition
81
that: "This is pretty scary stuff.
Yet, we should be asking why we have waited so long to propose an
Inspector General for the courts. An Inspector General already exists
for a host of federal agencies. The Inspector General's activities include
auditing, protecting whistle-blowers, and increasing the public's
confidence that government officials spend federal money legally, use
resources properly, and follow federal statutes. Search the U.S. statutes
in Westlaw for "Inspector General" and you will find 667 documents.
Search, instead, for "Inspector General" under the federal case law, and
you will find 4,821 documents, as of November 9, 2009. The concept of
"Inspector General" is well-known in the court system, but judges,
oddly enough, are immune from it.
82
There is, for example, an Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction.
The Coalition Provisional Authority, the U.S. overseer of Iraq from
June 2003 to June 2004, established a program review board, an
independent judiciary, and inspectors general in each agency to fight
corruption. 83 There is an Inspector General for the Pentagon. Like
other inspectors general, he investigates complaints, clears people
wrongly accused in the press, or reaffirms the wrongdoing in other
cases. 84 There is an Inspector General for the Department of Homeland

81. Q & A with Sandra Day O'Connor, TIME, Sept. 28, 2006, available at
http://www.time.comtime/nation/article/0,8599,1540702,00.html.
There's a resolution pending to give grounds for impeachment if a judge cites a foreign
judgment. You see a proposalfor an inspector generalfor judges. You see a proposal
on the ballot in November in North Dakota called Jail for Judges that would remove
judicial independence and set up a mechanism to punish judges criminally and civilly
for erroneous decisions. This is pretty scary stuff.
Id. (emphasis added).
82. Audit Hits Former U.S. Authority in Iraq, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2005, available at
http://www.washingtontimes.comnews/2005/jan/30/20050130-094529-3103r/
?feat=articlerelatedstories.
83. Id.
84. Rowan Scarborough, General Cleared in Church Speeches Case, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 20,
2004, at A03, available at http://www.washingtontimes.comnationaU20040820-1250283534r.htm.
The Pentagon inspector general did not substantiate complaints that Lt. Gen. William
G. Boykin misused his Army uniform, violated travel regulations or used improper
speech when he addressed 23 church groups on his views on faith and warfare.
But
Investigators also found Gen. Boykin did not improperly accept speaking fees ....
the IG report did find that Gen. Boykin violated three rules: He should have gotten
clearance from public affairs on the content of his speech; he should have told
audiences that his remarks were his own views, and not the Pentagon's; and he should
have filled out a form showing that one group reimbursed him $260 for travel.
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Security, so that when issues surface regarding possible improper
conduct, the Inspector General investigates.
The "passenger on
Northwest Flight 327 who blew the whistle on the incident, said she felt
'vindicated and relieved' after learning the investigation had been
85
ongoing since July."
The House of Representatives has created its own Inspector
General. 86
The House Committee on Standards handles ethical

complaints.

When House Speaker Gingrich assumed that office, he

ordered an audit by the House, which outside firms conducted.8 7 One
engages in such conduct not because he assumes that there is evil afoot,
but because he wants to assure everyone that things are fine. Outside
auditors perform that function. Inspectors General do so as well.

85. Audrey Hudson, PassengersDescribe FlightAs a TerroristDry Run, WASH. TIMES, Apr.
27, 2005, at A09, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/national/20050426-1059518168r.htm.
86. RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES, Rule 11(6),
available at http://clerk.house.govlegislative/rules/rule2.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2009)
[hereinafter Rule II]. See also Office of Inspector General, http://www.house.gov/IG (last visited
Aug. 29, 2009) (providing overview of Inspector General's position). Rules of the House of
Representatives, Rule 11: Other Officers And Officials, Part 6: Office of Inspector General
provides:
(a) There is established an Office of Inspector General.
(b) The Inspector General shall be appointed for a Congress by the Speaker, the
Majority Leader, and the Minority Leader, acting jointly.
(c) Subject to the policy direction and oversight of the Committee on House
Administration, the Inspector General shall only-(1) conduct periodic audits of the
financial and administrative functions of the House and of joint entities; (2) inform the
officers or other officials who are the subject of an audit of the results of that audit and
suggesting appropriate curative actions; (3) simultaneously notify the Speaker, the
Majority Leader, the Minority Leader, and the chairman and ranking minority member
of the Committee on House Administration in the case of any financial irregularity
discovered in the course of carrying out responsibilities under this clause; (4)
simultaneously submit to the Speaker, the Majority Leader, the Minority Leader, and
the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on House Administration
a report of each audit conducted under this clause; and (5) report to the Committee on
Standards of Official Conduct information involving possible violations by a Member,
Delegate, Resident Commissioner, officer, or employee of the House of any rule of the
House or of any law applicable to the performance of official duties or the discharge of
official responsibilities that may require referral to the appropriate Federal or State
authorities under clause 3(a)(3) of rule XI.
Rule II, supra.
87. "Among the administrative, legislative, and procedural actions taken by Republicans
during the 104th Congress were these: (1)passing the Congressional Accountability Act, which
applied workplace safety and antidiscrimination laws to Congress; (2) hiring Price Waterhouse
and Company, a nationally known accounting firm, to conduct an independent audit of House
finances..." The Cannon Centenary Conference: The Changing Nature of Speakership, Chapter
2, H.R. Doc. No. 108-204, at 43 (2003), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/
cdocuments/hd 108-204/text/chap2.html.
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The Inspector General's home page advises that there are now sixtynine statutory Inspectors General. 88 The duties of the Inspector General
or abuse" and to "report
are, in general, to "report waste, fraud,
89
violations of civil rights or civil liberties."
The purpose of an Inspector General for the Courts is not to harass
judges but to build confidence in the general public that the judiciary is
not above the law. This Inspector General should do things like:
(1) conduct investigations of matters relating to the Judicial Branch,
including possible misconduct of judges and proceedings under Chapter
16 of Title 28, United States Code, that may require oversight or other
action by Congress;
(2) conduct and supervise audits and investigations;
(3) prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse; and
(4) recommend changes in laws or regulations governing the Judicial
Branch.
These purposes are salutary. No judge should fear them. An
Inspector General would protect judges from frivolous or false charges.
Indeed, one wonders why it has taken so long to create an Inspector
General for the Courts. No organ of government should be above the
law.
Some judges greet an Inspector General the way Dracula would greet
garlic. The newspapers quote Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg as saying
that creating an Inspector General to monitor the ethical behavior of
federal judges is comparable to the former Soviet Union and is "a really
scary idea." 90 She continued, "[t]he judiciary is under assault in a way
that I haven't seen before." 9 1 Recall that Justice O'Connor also used
the same term "scary."

92

However, the sky is not falling. If Congress were to enact such a
law, it could work out the details to make sure that the Inspector
General will not interfere with judicial independence. The Chief Justice
could appoint this official in the Judicial Branch. When a judicial panel
88. Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, http://www.ignet.gov (last
visited Aug. 29 2009).
89. U.S. Department of Justice: Office of Inspector General, http://www.usdoj.gov/oig (last
visited Aug. 29, 2009) "The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) conducts independent
investigations, audits, inspections, and special reviews of United States Department of Justice
personnel and programs to detect and deter waste, fraud, abuse, and misconduct, and to promote
integrity, economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in Department of Justice operations." Id.
90. Tony Mauro, Justices Fight Back, U.S.A. TODAY, June 20, 2006, at A13, available at
http://blogs.usatoday.com/oped/2006/06/ustices-fight-.html.
91. E.g., id.
92. Q & A with SandraDay O'Connor,supra note 81.
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claims that there is a problem with the statute, the Inspector General
could forward the proposal to Congress. Recall that the judges in the
93
Manuel Real case said that Congress could change the statute.
However, those judges never forwarded that recommendation to
Congress. They never sent a copy of their opinion to the members of the
House and Senate Judiciary Committee. They did not write their
Congressmen asking for a change. Instead, they simply wrote an
opinion that removed the threat of discipline from a problem-judge and
then blamed Congress for the result.
An Inspector General would give people greater faith that, if there are
problems, the Inspector General would deal with them and not sweep
them under the rug. An Inspector General would be a confidencebuilder.
IV.

STRUCTURAL PROVISIONS IN OUR CONSTITUTION PROTECT THE

INDEPENDENCE OF EACH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT

The Framers created structural protections in the Constitution to
protect the independence of each branch, but they put no branch above
the law. For example, in Congress, the Framers authorized each House
to be the Judge of its Elections. 9 4 They also authorized each House to
punish its Members for disorderly conduct, and (if there is a supermajority) to even expel a Member for disorderly conduct. 9 5 And, of
course, the Constitution creates a special "Speech or Debate" privilege
96
of each Member.
The Framers did not create a similar set of immunities for the Judges
in Article III courts. The Framers did not make the judges the "judge"
of their own appointments; the judges cannot "expel" a fellow judge;
and, of course, there is no privilege analogous to the "Speech or
Debate" privilege. Instead, Framers guaranteed judicial independence
in a different way: the judges would have lifetime appointments and
97
Congress could not reduce their salaries.
It never occurred to the Framers that the judges should be, for
example, immune from audit. Similarly, it could never have occurred to
the Framers that the independence of the judicial branch meant that

93. In re Opinion of Judicial Conference Comm. to Review Circuit Council Conduct and
Disability Orders 449 F.3d 106, 109 (U.S. Jud. Conf. 2006).
94. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
95. Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
96. Id. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. "[A]nd for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be
questioned in any other Place." See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 2, § 8.6-8.
97. U.S. CONST. art. I11, § 1.
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judges are or should be immune from criticism. If that were true, law
reviews would be out of business. We all have the free speech right to
criticize judicial decisions, just as judges have the right to criticize each
other (or Congress) in their speeches and judicial opinions.
Nor does independence mean that judges are above the law. An
Inspector General would protect judges, by providing a ready answer to
criticism that they are not following the law. 9 8 An Inspector General
would also protect the judicial system by providing a better structure to
deal with valid complaints.
If there were an Inspector General and a disgruntled litigant
complained, judges would be able to respond that the Inspector General
would investigate. That would be a real confidence builder. If the
Inspector General investigated and found the complaints to be fruitless,
the complainant should have more confidence in the result. The judges,
not the Inspector General, will be the ones who impose any discipline,
such as a public or private reprimand, so there is no loss of judicial
independence.
But what if the complaint is valid? Then the judges would know that
there is a problem that needs correcting, and that they cannot rely on the
Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit to prevent discipline by ignoring the
rules. The proposed Inspector General would not have any authority or
jurisdiction over the substance of a judge's opinions. The proposed law
would not interfere with judges' independence to write their own
opinions.
V. INSPECTOR GENERAL: BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN THE JUDICIARY

The great majority of complaints against federal judges suffer the
same fate as the complaint against Judge Real: they are dismissed. In
fact, more than 99% of the complaints are dismissed. 9 9 This figure
would likely not change much if the federal courts had an Inspector
General because the very great majority of judges are honest and hardworking. But, a few complaints would be investigated and those
investigations would increase confidence in the judiciary. Right now,
the discipline process is conducted largely in secret.
Even when the process is public, it is not really public. In the
situation involving Judge Real, only with a great deal of investigation
98. See Ronald D. Rotunda, JudicialEthics, the Appearance of hnpropriely, and the Proposed
New ABA Judicial Code, 34 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1337, 1340-41 (2006) (explaining that the
"appearance of impropriety" standard is so vague that it does not protect the judiciary but rather
gives ammunition to those who wish to attack it).
99. Weinstein, supra note 24, at B3.
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can one know what is going on. In re Opinion of the Judicial
Conference Committee to Review Circuit Council Conduct and
Disability Orders1 °° managed to talk about the case without ever
mentioning the name of the judge who was the subject of the complaint!
In re Opinion also never identified the Circuit from which the case
came. This case is really an appeal from the Ninth Circuit, but one
would never know from reading the majority opinion or dissent. In fact,
the court never gives the citation to In re Complaint of Judicial
Misconduct.10 1 Go to Westlaw and look at the "full history" of this
case. It has none. In re Complaint is a judicial orphan, an appeal with
no prior or subsequent history. It just springs forth, like Pallas Athena
from the head of Zeus. However, this case springing forth does not give
birth to wisdom. One has to search and dig in the case of In re
Complaint to find out what is going on. That is not a confidence
builder. It appears as if the court was more interested in protecting the
reputation of a judge even after the court conceded that the judge acted
improperly.
The majority said that Congress should change the statute, but the
majority never took any steps to inform Congress of its conclusion. An
Inspector General could change that and periodically report to Congress
if there are laws that need changing.
If the federal courts had an Inspector General, we would have more
openness and people would be less likely to assume that judges are
above the law. When the disciplinary process for judges is conducted in
secret, we cannot be sure. An Inspector General would give us that
assurance.
Right now, we do not have that needed confidence. Even federal
judges do not have confidence in their own system. Consider, for
example, the concerns of John Kane, a judge in the U.S. District Court
for the District of Colorado. He sat on the Tenth Circuit Judicial
Council when the first complaint about a judge came up for
consideration: A district judge was trying to coerce counsel into
establishing a library on product liability cases in honor of himself.
It is worth quoting at length the experience and conclusions of Judge
Kane. He voted for judicial discipline but the Judicial Council took no
disciplinary action. The vote was three to three:
[A]nd so the Chief Judge voted against sustaining the complaint
because it was the first such complaint and he thought a close vote
100. In re Opinion of the Judicial Conference Comm. to Review Circuit Council Conduct and
Disability Orders, 449 F.3d 106 (U.S. Jud. Conf. 2006).
101. In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 425 F.3d 1179 (Jud. Council 9th Cir. 2005).
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was too slender a reed upon which to proceed. As we were leaving the
meeting, one of the judges who had voted to dismiss collared me and
it. The next time it could be you or me. We've
said, 'John, think about
1 02
got to stick together.'

Kane added:
I've recently heard of a number of judges who ruled on cases

involving companies in which they owned an interest, yet nothing was
done about it. The point is that the current system is a 'kiss your sister'
operation that hasn't worked and won't as long as judges are covering
and I think that
one another's butts. The present system is ineffectual
10 3
could be demonstrated by the very sorry record.

Even a U.S. Supreme Court Justice did not follow clear recusal rules
on stock ownership until the press publicized her mistake. 10 4 The
mistake, I am sure, was unintentional, but it took publicity to correct it;
the clarity of the rules was not enough. An Inspector General could
change that by dealing with the justice directly.
Other judges may not favor these conclusions but they do not dispute
the facts. Justice Stephen Breyer's Judicial Conduct and Disability Act
Study Committee reported that the judiciary failed to conduct a proper
investigation of judicial misconduct in five of seventeen "high visibility
cases" between 2001 and 2005.105 This error rate, the report admitted,
is "far too high."' 0 6 Yet, its proposed reforms were quite modest. For
example, it recommended that the Judicial Conference should "clarify

102. Ronald D. Rotunda, The Courts Need This Watchdog, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2006, at
A29 (quoting Judge Kane).
103. See id.
104. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg, for example, failed to disqualify herself from more than
twenty cases involving companies where her husband held stock, in violation of the federal
statute. See 28 U.S.C. §455(b)(5) (1974). When the news media published this, her husband
finally sold his stock so that she would not have to disqualify herself. Robert D. Hershey, Jr., The
Husband Of a Justice Sells His Stock After Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1997, at Al. See also
Richard Carelli, Ginsburg Took Part In Cases In Which Spouse Owned Stock, MEMPHIS COM.
APPEAL, July 11, 1997, at B7.
Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg may have violated a federal law 21 times
since 1995 by participating in cases involving companies in which her husband owned
stock.... Responding to queries by The Associated Press, Martin D. Ginsburg said he
has ordered his broker to sell all his stock in the eight companies.
Id.
105. JUDICIAL CONDUCT & DISABILITY ACT STUDY COMM., IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABILITY ACT OF 1980: A REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE 5 (Sept.
2006), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/breyercormitteereport.pdf ("We
consequently consider the mishandling of five such cases out of seventeen-an error rate of close
to 30%---far too high.").
106. Id.
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the Conference's authority to review decisions of its Review
10 7
Committee."
An Inspector General for the Courts needs to do a lot more than
merely clarify the Conference's authority. Recently, the Judicial
Conference of the United States amended its Code of Conduct for
United States Judges. 10 8 The revisions reflect, to some extent, the 2007
revisions of the ABA Model Rules of Judicial Conduct. 10 9 The popular
press reports that the new Judicial Code "apparently expands
significantly the definition of the 'appearance of impropriety.""'10 Not
so.
The former U.S. Code of Conduct defined "appearance of
impropriety" as follows:
The test for appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct would
create in reasonable minds, with knowledge of all the relevant
circumstances that a reasonable inquiry would disclose, a perception
that the judge's ability to carry out judicial resp,onsibilities with
integrity, impartiality, and competence is impaired. 1
But the new, improved version reads:
An appearance of impropriety occurs when reasonable minds, with
knowledge of all the relevant circumstances disclosed by a reasonable
inquiry, would conclude that the judge's honesty, integrity,
impartiality, temperament, or fitness to serve as a judge is
impaired. 112
So, instead of a reasonable perception that there is an impairment of a
judge's "integrity, impartiality, and competence," the new test is that
there is a reasonable perception that there is an impairment of a judge's
"honesty, integrity, impartiality, temperament, or fitness to serve as a
judge."
If anything, it appears that the new rules do not "expand
significantly" the definition. In fact, the new rules seem slightly
narrower than the one it replaced. The new version says that the
107. Id. at 126.
108. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, THE CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED
STATES JUDGES (Effective July 1, 2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/library/
codeOfConduct/RevisedCodeEffectiveJuly-01-09.pdf [hereinafter CODE OF CONDUCT].
109. ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 21, §§ 10.0-1 to 10.4-4.5.
110. E.g., Martha Neil, Stricter Impropriety Standard is Adopted by Judicial Conference,
ABA J. LAW NEWS Now, Mar. 17, 2009, available at http://www.abajournal.comnewsl
stricter-impropriety-standard is adopted by-judicial conference.
111. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDING COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY AND JUDICIAL CODE SUBCOMMiITEE, 1990 ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT, Canon 2A cmt. (1990), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mcjc/canon2.html.
112. CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 108, Canon 2A cmt.
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reasonable person "would conclude" that the judge is impaired. The
prior version says that a reasonable person would have "a perception
that" the judge is impaired.
The new version adds a few words, which were already implied in
the original litany of nouns listing judicial virtues. It is hard to think of
what the first, rather vague, definition would prohibit or allow that the
second, rather vague definition would not prohibit or not allow.
Tinkering with "appearance of impropriety" will not do the job. We
need to do more. Creating an Inspector General can do much more to
build confidence.
VI. CONCLUSION

While the vast majority of judges uphold the highest ethical
standards, some do not. Even more important, the procedure to
investigate and discipline problem-judges is flawed. As Judge Winter
has acknowledged, the status quo is not a confidence builder.1 1 3 The
most direct and effective way to restore public confidence in the
judiciary is to create an Inspector General. Instead of judges policing
themselves, the independence of the Inspector General allows for
careful screening of potential ethical violations. This solution is
something that both the public and the judiciary should welcome.

113. In re Opinion of Judicial Conference Comm. to Review Circuit Council Conduct and
Disability Orders, 449 F.3d 106, 117 (U.S. Jud. Conf. 2006) (Winter, J., dissenting).

